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Abstract 
Ambient air temperatures are expected to increase in the US desert southwest by 1-5°C mid-century which will strain the electric 
power grid through increased loads, reduced power capacities, efficiencies, and material lifespans. To better understand and 
quantify this risk, a power infrastructure failure model is created to estimate changes in outage rates of components for increases 
in air temperatures in Arizona. Components analyzed include generation, transmission lines, and substations, because their 
outages can lead to cascading failures and interruptions of other critical infrastructure systems such as water, transportation, and 
information/communication technology. Preliminary results indicate that components could require maintenance or replacement 
up to 3 times more often due to mechanical failures, outages could occur up to 30 times more often due to overcurrent tripping, 
and the probability of cascading failures could increase 30 times as well for a 1°C increase in ambient air temperature. 
Preventative measures can include infrastructure upgrades to more thermal resistant parts, installation of cooling systems, smart 
grid power flow controls, and expanding programs for demand side management and customer energy efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
The electric power grid in the USA, and desert southwest specifically, is of the most reliable in the world [1-2], 
but like all electrical power systems it is sensitive to heat in terms of its power capacity and component materials’ 
life-span [3]. Arizona’s power authorities typically plan 10-15 years in advance to manage risk considering increased 
system burdens due to social, economic, and technological, environmental, and policy factors [4-5]. These plans do 
not explicitly consider potential effects of rising ambient air temperatures. Significant increases in ambient air 
temperatures (1-5°C) are predicted by mid-century [4-5], and grid construction projects require as much as 10 years 
and many millions of dollars each to complete. Therefore, developing a better understanding of the risks of rising air 
temperatures to the power grid is both timely and necessary to maintain reliable critical infrastructure systems. 
Predicting the change in probability of electric power failing is obtained using fault-tree logic in this study [8]. A 
failure analysis framework is developed inclusive of generation, transmission, and substation component 
performance using thermophysical equations for power flow and material degradation rate with stochastic inputs for 
air temperature. The model estimates the probability of failure when supply is insufficient or component outages 
occur. The effects of increases in air temperature are quantified as changes in power flow capacity (MW) and 
efficiency (% MWh), as well as the mechanical mean time to failure (MTTF) of component parts. The potential 
change in multiple simultaneous outages occurring and triggering cascading failures is also quantified. This research 
estimates the magnitude of the risk of rising air temperatures to critical civil infrastructure systems, and identifies 
corresponding vulnerabilities within the power grid. 
 
Nomenclature 
θµ °C  mean of the maximum ambient air temperature during June, July, and August 
θσ  °C  standard deviation of θµ 
θ+ °C  increase in θµ, input control variable 
θPRM °C  average temperature at which the PRM is engaged on a day 
θPRMcrit °C  average temperature at which the PRM reaches its critical value on a day 
βGC % loss of generation capacity per θ+ 
βTDE % loss of T&D network efficiency per θ+ 
βPKload % increase in peak load per θ+ 
βTC % loss of transmission line current capacity per θ+ 
βSC % loss of substation transformer current capacity per θ+ 
βPK % net peak load adjustment factor per θ+ 
α % probability that two simultaneous component outages lead to a cascading failure in the system 
λ #/day failure rate 
a
bPf'  % change in probability of failure, or λ, of a system component, where a = P or M, b = G or T or S 
a
bkPf  % probability of failure, or λ, of a system component, where a = P or M, b = G or T or S, k = i or f 
Ab years age of component, where b = G or T or S 
IP % current in a system component as a percentage of the component’s rated ampacity 
MTTF years mean time to failure 
PRM  % planning reserve margin 
PRMcrit % PRM critical value for potential service interruption and the possibility of cascading failures  
S  % strength loss per year 
STeol  % strength loss for a transmission line to reach expected lifespan 
 
Commonly used subscripts and superscripts 
P, M power- or mechanical-based component failure  
G, T, S generation, transmission, substation 
i, f initial (current air temperature scenario with θµ and θσ), final (higher ambient air temperature scenario θ+) 
μ, σ mean, standard deviation 
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2. Methods 
This analysis focuses on the thermal performance of the three major current carrying components in the electric 
power grid: generation, transmission, and substation transformers. This approach is consistent with other recent 
studies of the impact of rising air temperatures on power infrastructure such as [9]. To estimate how much 
increasing ambient air temperatures can increase component outages, cascading failures, and ultimately service 
interruptions, it is necessary to first understand the flow of electric power in the system, as well as the sequence of 
events that can lead to interruptions and potentially cascading outages. See Fig. 1. System operators maintain an n-1 
redundancy standard in design at the high-voltage transmission level meaning that the single largest generator, 
transmission line branch, or substation (of which there are at least hundreds in every region) can fail at any time 
without any interruption to service [10]. These n-1 redundancies are represented in Fig. 1b using octagon boxes and 
logical AND gates. Service interruptions due to major component failures only occur when more than one individual 
component fails at the same time. Such events can lead to cascading failures including blackouts as in [11]. 
Service interruption occurs when power does not reach the load, such as a building or street light, and this 
analysis estimates specifically how much the frequency of service interruptions can increase. Fig. 1b shows the two 
ways that a service interruption can occur that are analyzed in this paper: either there is not enough total generation 
to meet total demand, or particular power pathways (transmission lines and substations) do not have sufficient 
capacity to deliver power to the load. The following list explains how increases in ambient air temperatures can 
trigger failures leading to service interruptions consistent with the lettering in Fig. 1b. 
A. High air temperatures can result in reduced peak energy generation capacity and or efficiency losses in the 
transmission and distribution (T&D) network [8, 11]. If the system is also in high demand, (B), then load can 
exceed generation and put the system in a state of over demand. If there are insufficient generation reserves, then 
there will be a service interruption. 
B. High air temperatures can result in higher demand, especially during the already hot summer months due to 
increased burden on building air conditioning systems [12]. 
C. High air temperatures result in less T&D power flow capacity in lines and transformers  [8, 11]. If a circuit is in 
high demand, then power flow can exceed safe operating capacity and lines and transformers can exceed their 
rated ampacities and become in a state of overcurrent [11].  
i. If protection devices function correctly, then overcurrent will cause tripping of the line or transformer 
within the T&D network  [11]. If there is insufficient capacity in parallel branches to provide power to the 
load, then there will be a service interruption [11]. 
ii. If a protection device fails to trip and a circuit is overcurrent, then a component can exceed its thermal 
rating. Excess heat accelerates the chemical degradation rate of sensitive materials and can result in 
mechanical failure (E) [12-13]. Protection devices can fail because they are not accurately designed or 
calibrated for local climate conditions or other reasons [1]. Depending on the type and location of 
overcurrent failure, a generator, transmission line, substation, quality device, or other protection device can 
fail. If a generator fails, then the system state goes to (A) as the system now has less generation. If a 
transformer fails, then it goes to (A) and or (C) as the T&D network operates at lower efficiency and or has 
less power flow capacity. If a power quality device fails, then it goes to (C) again or directly to overcurrent 
depending on the circumstances. If another redundant protection device fails, then the cycle of potential 
failures repeats for additional components on connected circuits. 
D. High air temperatures can result in a protection device failing to trip  [1]. The device could be calibrated to a 
certain power rating that should be lower for the actual air temperature. If that occurs during high loading, then a 
component can go overcurrent and fail as in (ii).  
E. High air temperatures can result in an accelerated physical material degradation rate, which can result in 
accelerated failures for any electrical devices [3]. The same failure scenarios can occur as described above, with 
the addition of an undesired trip of a protection device. If a protection device fails with an undesired trip, and 
there is no redundant power flow, then a service interruption occurs. 
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Fig. 1. (a) Power grid infrastructure analysis system boundary; (b) Fault tree to service interruption. (a) Shows the flow of power from 
generation to load through system components and identifies the analysis system boundary inclusive of major power-flow components including: 
generation, transmission, substation transformers, and load. Changes in performance of protection and power quality devices are not analysed.  
(b) Shows the terminal event of a service interruption on the right, and the power- and mechanical-failures that can lead to a service interruption 
logically preceding from the left. On the far left are the events that can be caused by higher ambient air temperatures and ultimately lead to 
service interruption in conjunction with other failures as indicated. Mechanical failures feedback into the event triggers as their loss of 
functionality results in a loss of power-flow that could cause an interruption.  
 
A model is developed to estimate the change in probabilities of component failures (or failure rates) and service 
interruptions due to increases in ambient air temperatures, shown in equation (1). This is done by quantifying the 
fault processes in Fig. 1 for the primary current-carrying components. The structure of this model is shown in Fig. 2 
where climate and infrastructure inputs are used to estimate changes in power-based and mechanical-based failures. 
These values are used to estimate the change in probability of a cascading event that can be triggered by two or 
more component failures occurring at the same time.  
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Fig. 2. Failure analysis model. The model is structured in five parts: (i) ambient air temperature, the increase of which is the primary control 
variable, θ+; (ii) power capacity and energy efficiency factors, β’s, which are proportional to ambient air temperature; (iii) probability of power-
based failures for each component type, P
bPf , for which there could be insufficient capacity to support power demand; (iv) probability of 
mechanical-based failures for each component type, M
GPf ,wherein the wear of thermally sensitive parts over time results in a higher failure rate 
or probability of failure on a given day; (v) cascading failures, that can occur if two or more component failures occur at the same time. 
, ,
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bf bia
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% per day (1) 
2.1. Ambient air temperature 
Ambient air temperature is the primary control variable in the model, and is defined as a normal distribution 
curve with base case mean maximum temperature θµ = 42.22°C and standard deviation θσ = 3.04°C from the average 
maximum temperature at the Phoenix airport for the months of June, July, and August 2009 to 2014 [15]. 
Summertime increases in air temperature, θ+, are modeled as increases in the mean of the maximum temperature θµ 
with no change in standard deviation θσ. 
2.2. Electric power capacity and energy efficiency factors 
Electronic components are generally subject to at least two stresses: electrical and thermal [3]. Electrical 
resistance increases as conductor temperature increases, which further increases operating temperature and 
decreases efficiency [16]. The model inputs for capacity and efficiency losses are βGC = 0.7%, βTDE = 0.5%, βPKload = 
7.5%, βTC = 1.5%, and βSC = 0.7% per 1°C increase in ambient air temperature as are the marginal unit linearization 
of the results in [5, 11]. The generation factor only considers natural gas plants. These values are for high operating 
temperatures, which are within the range of this analysis, and are combined into the net adjustment factors βPK = 
βPKload + βTDE + βGC = 8.7%, βT = βPKload + βTC = 9%, and βS = βPKload + βSC = 8.2% per °C.  
2.3. Power-based failures 
Power-based failures are failures where there is insufficient capacity in a circuit to meet demand. These can occur 
due to insufficient generation, when a transmission line is overcurrent, or a substation is overcurrent.  
2.3.1. Generation – PRM deficiency 
PRM is the amount of generation capacity available to meet expected demand, and is calculated as the difference 
in prospective resources and net internal demand, divided by net internal demand [17]. PRM is institutionally 
managed to maintain reliable grid operations in the event of unexpected increases in demand and or outages of 
existing capacity [17]. System operators historically issue alerts when PRM falls below 5% and ask customers to 
curtail their electricity usage [18]. Therefore 5% is used as the critical PRM value, PRMcrit, where other 
simultaneous component failures can cause a service interruption and trigger cascading failures. 
P
GPf'  is estimated in equation (1) assuming PRM is marginally engaged for the top 5% of air temperature values 
for θµ and θσ, which is ≥ 47.22°C and represents the expected 4.6 hottest days per year from 2009 to 2014 [15]. The 
temperature that PRMcrit occurs at is estimated in equation (2), where PRMi = 17% as is WECC’s 2024 projected 
summer PRM [19]. PGiPf  = 1.8% per day is the area under a normal curve of θµ and θσ above θPRMcrit.  PGfPf  is 
estimated by shifting θµ by θ+. 
  
 i critPRM
PK
PRMcrit
PRM PRMT T E
  °C (2) 
2.3.2. Transmission – Line Overcurrent 
P
TPf'  is estimated in equation (1) assuming that if a line exceeds its rated amperage it will trip. PTiPf = 0.0032% 
per day is the area under a normal distribution for the line load as a percentage of the current carrying capacity 
where IPTµ = 60%, IPTσ = 10%, and rated amperage is equal to 1. 
P
TfPf  is estimated by shifting IPTµ by θ+ and βT. 
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2.3.3. Substation – Transformer Overcurrent 
P
SPf'  is estimated using the same method as 2.3.2 by using equation (1), and assuming that if a transformer 
exceeds its rated amperage it will trip. PSiPf =0.0032% per day is the area under a normal distribution for the 
transformer load as a percentage of the current carrying capacity where IPSµ = 60%, IPSσ = 10%, and rated amperage 
is equal to 1. PSfPf  is estimated by shifting IPSµ by θ+ and βS. 
2.4. Mechanical-based Failures 
Mechanical failures occur due to physical degradation of thermally-sensitive parts within components such as a 
conductor, insulator, or contact. A failure rate, λ, is defined as the inverse of the MTTF with units of failures per 
day. Change in failure rates are estimated as the percent change in the initial and expected λ for increased air 
temperature conditions as in equation (1). 
2.4.1. Generation – Part Wear 
A value of 0.001% is assumed for PGiPf , and PGfPf  is set to that multiplied by (1+θ+/100). 
2.4.2. Transmission – Conductor Loss of Strength 
There are three primary factors considered in defining the thermal limit of a power line: sag, loss of strength, and 
the fittings of the conductor [20].  Sag is measured as the vertical distance that the line moves closer towards the 
ground due to thermal expansion, and increases the chance of flashover resulting in a ground fault and outage of the 
circuit. Such an event typically occurs when a line comes too close to trees, which may occur because trees have not 
been trimmed, or the line sags beyond the safety margin [13]. While sag is a mechanical process, it is not associated 
with conductor damage or loss of life [13]. Therefore analyzing the physical conductor sag constraints would be 
redundant with the previous power-based failure analysis for transmission line overcurrent. Loss of conductor 
strength occurs due to annealing, a gradual process whereby a metal recrystallizes over time, and ACSR conductors 
anneal at operating temperatures above 100°C [21]. Significant loss of strength may result in breakages during high 
mechanical stress events such as gusts of wind [21]. Properly designed and selected fittings are not a thermal 
limiting factor for the conductor [13]. 
M
TPf' is estimated by equation  (1) assuming a MTTFTi = 70 years for ACSR lines based on [22] and that it is 
causally proportional to loss of conductor strength due to annealing. MTiPf  = λTi = 0.0039% per day is the inverse of 
the MTTFTi.  
M
TfPf  is estimated by adjusting MTTF as in equation (3). The strength loss associated with conductor 
end of life, STeol, is estimated as the weighted sum of the hours per day over MTTFTi that a transmission line is 
expected to exceed nominal current by 10%, 20%, and 30%, and log-linear strength loss factors of 3%, 5%, and 
7.5% respectively that are the approximate results of [23]. This assumes that percentage loss of tensile strength 
relates 1:1 to reduced lifespan. The initial strength reduction rate, STi, is estimated linearly as STeol per MTTFTi. 
Transmission line current is assumed to be normally distributed with initial current loading IPTµ = 60% and IPTσ = 
10% as in 2.3. Nominal current is assumed to be 85% of rated capacity. The higher ambient air temperature scenario 
strength reduction rate STf is estimated using the same approach, increasing IPTµ by βT and θ+ accordingly. 
  
  
 
Teol Ti T
Tf T
Tf
S S A
MTTF A
S
   years (3) 
2.4.3. Substation – transformer insulation degradation 
Substations consist of several power quality and protection devices to ensure safe and reliable grid operations, 
and this analysis focuses on transformers which are current-carrying devices used to change voltage levels for safe 
and efficient T&D of power throughout the network. The major parts of interest within transformers are the 
conductor windings and their insulation. 
M
SPf'  is estimated by equation (1) assuming an initial MTTF of insulation life of 48.9 years as are the results of 
[24] for an oil-based distribution transformer, and is assumed representative of substation transformers. MSiPf = λSi = 
0.0056% per day. MSfPf  is estimated scaling MTTF by the marginal unit linear adjustment factor from the same 
study where MTTF decreased from 48.9 to 46 years per 1% increase in ambient air temperature. It is important to 
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note that this method does not explicitly consider the current loading at the substation IP, and that an oil-based 
distribution transformer may not be representative of transmission-level transformers. 
2.5. Cascading failures 
The change in probability of a cascading failure, ∆Pc, is calculated in the same manner as equation (1). iPc = 
0.0013% per day and fPc are estimated in equation (4) as one minus the probability that no failure occurs on a 
random day minus the probability of exactly one failure occurring on a day, times the cascade trigger coefficient 
α=10%. The probability that two simultaneous outages trigger a cascade are the results of [25] wherein a dynamic 
power flow simulation of a 2,383-bus system was used to assess the probability of cascading failures occurring in 
the event of two simultaneous outages within 2,896 component branches for n-1 contingency. 
,, ,
1 (1 ) (1 ) , , , { , }a a ak bk bk bk
a ba b a b
i initial
Pc Pf Pf Pf where k a b other a bf finalD
§ ·ª º§ ·ª º ­¨ ¸          « »¨ ¸ ®« »¨ ¸ ¯« »¬ ¼ © ¹¬ ¼© ¹
¦   % per day (4) 
3. Results 
A 1-5°C increase in ambient air temperatures can significantly increase the rate of mechanical- and power-based 
failures as well as the cascading outages in the electric grid in Arizona. As listed in Table 1, mechanical failures in 
transmission lines could increase almost 200% for a 1°C increase. This means that the same strength loss that occurs 
in an overhead ACSR line over 70 years due to annealing could occur in 25 years, and lines could need to be 
reconductored or replaced that much more often. Mechanical failures in substations could increase by 16% with the 
first 1°C θ₊, and then approximately double for each 1°C thereafter if conductor insulation oil is not changed with 
that additional frequency. Power failures due to insufficient generation could be more than twice as likely with a 1°C 
increase in air temperatures. In that case reserve margins would fall below 5% on very hot days more often with 
additional load, reduced generation capacity, and reduced distribution efficiency proportional to the distribution of 
daily max temperatures. Power failure frequency in substations and transformers can increase 22x to 30x 
respectively for a 1°C θ₊. Increases in system peak load and decreases in current capacity in those components 
during peak hours could result in exceedance of rated current and tripping with much higher frequency. The 
probability of two or more failures triggering a cascading outage can increase by 26x with the first θ₊=1°C. The 
change in probability of cascading failures grows exponentially with θ₊ and increases in power-based failures. If the 
probability of a cascading failure event is currently once every 20-30 years, then that probability could increase to 
once every 1-2 years with hotter summers if preventative measures are not taken.  
 
Table 1. Increased probability of failures per degree increase in ambient air temperature. 
θΕ (°C) PGPf'  PTPf'  PSPf'  MGPf'  MTPf'  MSPf'  Pc'  
0 -   -   -   -   -   -   -   
1 135  2,955  2,225  1  183  16  2,587  
2 400  43,799  28,751  2  409  39  77,788  
3 871  305,542  194,967  3  576  73  1,287,827  
4 1,620  1,087,885  744,306  4  685  128  10,275,393  
5 2,691  2,183,150  1,704,373  5  711  236  35,679,472  
4. Conclusion 
Specific vulnerabilities in the electric power grid are identified where proactive governance may be able to 
prevent future outages otherwise resultant from rising ambient air temperatures in Arizona. Preventative measures in 
operations and maintenance could include more frequent reconductoring and changing of insulators, component 
derating, upgrades to more thermal resistant parts, forced-air cooling systems, dynamic power-flow routing, and or 
demand side management programs including energy efficiency, demand response, and peak load shifting [4, 11, 19, 
24]. Increased inspections and flexible maintenance schedules around weather patterns could be useful in the 
interim. Failure to do so may result in outages in other critical interdependent infrastructure systems including water, 
transportation, telecommunications, and information technology [27].  
1353 Daniel Burillo et al. /  Procedia Engineering  145 ( 2016 )  1346 – 1353 
References 
[1] Nerc, “State of Reliability 2013,” no. May, pp. 1–71, 2013. 
[2] T. L. C. Group, “Benchmarking Study of Arizona Public Service Company’s Operations, Cost, and 
Financial Performance,” 2011. 
[3] R. Denning, Applied R&M Manual for Defence Systems. 2012. 
[4] APS, “APS 2014 Integrated Resource Plan,” 2014. 
[5] SRP, “2010 Salt River Project Ten Year Plan,” 2010. 
[6] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Summary for policymakers,” Clim. Chang. 2014 Mitig. Clim. 
Chang. Contrib. Work. Gr. III to Fifth Assess. Rep. Intergov. Panel Clim. Chang., pp. 1–31, 2014. 
[7] J. Sathaye, L. Dale, P. Larsen, G. Fitts, K. Koy, S. Lewis, and A. Lucena, “Estimating Risk To California 
Energy Infrastructure From Projected Climate Change,” Publication number: CEC-500-2011- XXX, 2011. 
[8] E. J. Henley and H. Kumamoto, Reliability Engineering and Risk Assessment. Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1981. 
[9] J. a. Sathaye, L. L. Dale, P. H. Larsen, G. a. Fitts, K. Koy, S. M. Lewis, and A. F. P. de Lucena, “Estimating 
impacts of warming temperatures on California’s electricity system,” Glob. Environ. Chang., vol. 23, no. 2, 
pp. 499–511, 2013. 
[10] J. Mistry and B. Keel, “Guidelines For Electric System Planning,” 2013. 
[11] Ferc and Nerc, “Arizona-Southern California Outages on September 8 2011,” 2012. 
[12] M. Bartos and M. Chester, “Supplementary information for ‘impacts of climate change on electric power 
supply in the western united states,’” 2015. 
[13] H. Wan, “Increasing thermal rating by risk analysis,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 815–828, 
1999. 
[14] P. K. Sen, S. Pansuwan, K. Malmedal, O. Martinoo, and M. G. Simoes, “Transformer Overloading and 
Assessment of Loss-of-Life for Liquid-Filled Transformerss,” 2011. 
[15] Weather Underground, “Weather History for Phoenix, AZ,” 2015. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/KPHX/2014/5/1/CustomHistory.html?dayend=1&monthend
=10&yearend=2014&req_city=&req_state=&req_statename=&reqdb.zip=&reqdb.magic=&reqdb.wmo=. 
[Accessed: 07-Oct-2015]. 
[16] IEEE, “IEEE Standard for Calculating the Current- Temperature of Bare Overhead Conductors,” 2006. 
[17] NERC, “Planning Reserve Margin,” 2016. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ri/Pages/PlanningReserveMargin.aspx. [Accessed: 07-Jan-2016]. 
[18] CEC, “High Temperatures & Electricity Demand: An Assessment of Supply Adequacy in California, Trends 
& Outlook,” 1999. 
[19] WECC, “2014 Power Supply Assessment,” no. September, 2014. 
[20] H. a. Smolleck and J. P. Sims, “Guidelines for the selection and operation of bare ACSR conductors with 
regard to current-carrying capacity,” Electr. Power Syst. Res., vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 179–190, 1982. 
[21] K. Kopsidas and S. M. Rowland, “Evaluating opportunities for increasing power capacity of existing 
overhead line systems,” IET Gener. Transm. Distrib., vol. 5, no. 1, p. 1, 2011. 
[22] D. G. Havard, M. K. Bissada, C. G. Fajardo, D. J. Horrocks, J. R. Meale, J. Motlis, M. Tabatabai, and K. S. 
Yoshiki-Gravelsins, “Aged ACSR conductors. II. Prediction of remaining life,” Proc. 1991 IEEE Power 
Eng. Soc. Transm. Distrib. Conf., 1991. 
[23] M. M. I. Bhuiyan, P. Musilek, J. Heckenbergerova, and D. Koval, “Evaluating thermal aging characteristics 
of electric power transmission lines,” Electr. Comput. Eng. (CCECE), 2010 23rd Can. Conf., pp. 1–4, 2010. 
[24] K. T. Muthanna,  a. Sarkar, K. Das, and K. Waldner, “Transformer Insulation Life Assessment,” IEEE 
Trans. Power Deliv., vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 150–156, 2006. 
[25] J. Song, “Dynamic Modeling and mitigation of Cascading Failure in Power Systems,” Oregon State 
University, 2015. 
[26] K. W. Hedman and S. Member, “Real-Time Contingency Analysis With Transmission Switching on Real 
Power System Data,” pp. 3–4, 2015. 
[27] S. M. Rinaldi, J. P. Peerenboom, and T. K. Kelly, “Identifying, understanding, and analyzing critical 
infrastructure interdependencies,” IEEE Control Syst. Mag., vol. 21, no. 6, pp. 11–25, 2001. 
 
